Tuesday 14 September, 14:00 - 16:00 CEST

There is increasing evidence that the timeliness of completion and the ability to control costs is also a function of the contractual structures of nuclear new build projects. In an overall framework of appropriate risk allocation, such contractual structures, on their own, as well as in conjunction with specific additional incentives (bonuses for efficient performance, penalties for exceeding either construction times or budgets etc.) have the power to influence organisation and behaviour throughout the value chain and to increase performance and efficiency. This regards the overall contract between the owner of the plant, the party responsible for logistics and construction and the provider of the key nuclear components, as well the detailed contractual arrangement throughout the supply chain. Proper planning and anticipation are necessary conditions for well-performing contractual structures. The challenge is to find the right balance between high-powered incentives for providers and suppliers while providing the necessary certainty and stability for all parties involved in the construction process. The purposes of the seminar was to provide an opportunity to present and discuss the performance of different contractual structures in recently concluded or ongoing nuclear new build projects.

This webinar was moderated by Jan Horst Keppler, Chief Energy Economist, OECD Nuclear Energy Agency

Opening remarks by Diane Cameron, Head of Division, Nuclear Technology Development and Economics, OECD Nuclear Energy Agency

Panelists

• Simon Taylor, Cambridge University

• Milt Caplan, MZConsulting & World Nuclear Association

• Zeina Elhami, Ontario Power Generation

• Shawn Shaler, Southern Company

• Jayne Gibson, Jacobs

• John Parsons, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

• Michel Berthelemy,  OECD Nuclear Energy Agency